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Abstract
Part I of this Note presents an overview of the proposed system for compensation of victims of
hazardous substance pollution in the United States. The focus will be on cost allocation, eligibility,
the adequacy of compensation and the exclusivity of the remedy, as these factors reflect the goals
of compensation and deterrence. Part II describes the Japanese system and experience with these
factors. In Part III, the United States proposal is evaluated in light of the Japanese law and the
Japanese experience under the law. The two systems are then evaluated in terms of the twin
goals of compensation and deterrence. Analysis of the different approaches shows a stress on
compensation in the United States proposal, and a mix of compensation and deterrence under the
Japanese law. This Note concludes that in the field of hazardous substance pollution the goal of
compensation should outweigh the goal of deterrence. The United States proposal reflects this
preference.

COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE
POLLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The need to compensate victims of hazardous substance pollution1 has become a major legislative policy issue in the United
States.2 Public concern over hazardous waste disasters, both in the
United States 3 and abroad,4 has fostered attempts to establish ade5
quate compensatory schemes.

1. This Note deals primarily with hazardous substances as defined broadly in the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14) (Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited as CERCLA]. As in CERCLA, the emphasis in
this Note is on hazardous substances that have entered the environment in the form of wastes
and spills. See id. § 9601(22).
2. See, e.g., Ember, Legal Remedies for Toxics Victims Begin Taking Shape, CHEM. &
ENc'c NEWS, Mar. 28, 1983, at 11 (higher priority being given to bills providing redress for
victims of exposure to hazardous substances); Main, The Hazards Of Helping Toxic Waste
Victims, FORTUNE, Oct. 31, 1983, at 158 (important questions facing Congress in enacting
law for hazardous substance victim compensation); Mosher, 'A Ticking Time Bomb'Compensation For Victims of Hazardous Waste Dumps, NAT'L J., Jan. 15, 1983, at 120
(outlining effort to be made in 98th Congress for victims' compensation); Outen, Injury from
Hazardous Chemicals: Compensating Innocent Bystanders, ENVTL. F., Feb. 1983, at 6
(difficult public policy issues involved in congressional debate); Victim Compensation: Paying for the Damage Caused by Toxic Wastes, CHEM. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1983, at 32 (action on
victim's compensation taking place in Washington, the states and the courts).
3. In a speech before the National Agricultural Chemical Manufacturers Association,
Senator Robert Stafford, Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, remarked that "the single category of pollution which they [the public] fear most is
hazardous waste and toxic chemicals." Sen. Robert Stafford, Remarks at the National Agricultural Chemicals Association Board of Directors Winter Meeting 3 (Feb. 21, 1983) (available from the Office of Sen. Stafford).
Hazardous waste disasters in, among other places, Love Canal, New York, Toone,
Tennessee, and Hopewell, Virginia have focused public attention on their dangers. See
ENVTL. L. INST.,

96TH CONG.,

2D SESS.,

SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR Toxic

MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY AND TEXAS
43-44, 47-48, 55-56 (Comm. Print 1980) (prepared for the Senate Comm. on Env't. and
Public Works) [hereinafter cited as SIX CASE STUDIES]; OFFICE OF PUB. HEALTH, N.Y.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, LOVE CANAL, A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 46-52 (1981)
(chronology of events at Love Canal) [hereinafter cited as LOVE CANAL]. See generally M.
BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY TOXIC CHEMICALS (1980) (dangers of
hazardous waste in the United States); S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE
IN AMERICA (1982) (overview of hazardous waste problems in the United States) [hereinafter
cited as S. EPSTEIN & L. BROWN].
4. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD):
[R]esolutions passed by the World Health Assembly in 1977 and 1978 indicate
growing worldwide concern about the adverse effects of chemicals on health. These
SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA,

CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN,

502

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:501

In the United States, common law tort remedies inadequately
6
compensate those injured by exposure to hazardous substances.
Procedura 7 and substantive8 barriers, as well as exorbitant transaction costs, 9 have prevented victims from collecting in court for their
damages." Recognizing this inadequacy, Congress is considering

resolutions voiced special concern about the risk of chronic or combined toxic effects
from exposures to chemicals. The increasing number of accidental releases of chemicals which have resulted in harm to man and the environment also provided
grounds for concern.
ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPRATION AND DEV., THE STATE OF TIE ENVIRONMENT IN OECD
MEMBER COUNTRIES 103 (1979) (citations omitted).
A large plurality of Japanese citizens recently identified environmental pollution by
chemical substances as the most crucial environmental problem. ENV'T ACENCY, GOV'T OF
JAPAN, JAPAN ENVIRONMENT SUMMARY 1973-1982, at 447 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENT SUMMARY]. Recently, in Seveso, Italy, dioxin escaped from a chemical plant forcing
the evacuation of the city and the hospitalization of some citizens. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1976,
at 3, col. 3.
5. See Ember, supra note 2.
6. See Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 520-21; INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR RELEASES OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES,

THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT 1,

24 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SUPERFUND CONCEPT]; Bartlett, The Legal Development of a
Viable Remedy for Toxic Pollution Victims, 4 Toxic SUBSTANCES J. 277, 277 (1983); Ginsberg
& Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.
859 (1981); Soble, A Proposalfor the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic
Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 683, 703 (1977); Trauberman,
Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the
Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 188 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Trauberman,
Toxic Torts].
7. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. It was recently stated: "Transaction
costs include both governmental administrative costs, generally borne by the public, and
[litigation] costs, such as the cost of acquiring information needed to meet a burden of proof,
usually borne by participants in a reallocation proceeding." Note, Allocating the Costs of
Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 584, 585 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Allocating the Costs].
10. See Hazardous Substance Victim's Compensation Legislation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Transp., and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.-104 (testimony of A. Roisman, Esq.) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on Victims Compensation]. Anthony Roisman, testifying before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism, stated that:
Today, seven years after the Love Canal disaster became a matter of public knowledge, . . . not a single victim of that tragedy has received any compensation for the
health damages they suffered and continue to suffer. Nor have any other victims of
hazardous waste been compensated for the damages they suffered-not in Times
Beach, Missouri; not in Dallas, Texas; not in Midland, Michigan; not in Jackson
Township, New Jersey; not in Hardeman County, Tennessee.
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the Comprehensive Hazardous Substance Cleanup and Emergency
Relief Act of 1984"1 (Proposed Bill). The Proposed Bill would reform traditional tort causes of action for hazardous waste injuries
and create a federally-administered compensation system for the
victims of these injuries.
Other countries have grappled with the problem of compensating pollution victims. 12 Since 1973, however, Japan has administered one of the most comprehensive compensation systems for
victims of environmental pollution.1 3 A comparison between the
Japanese administrative compensation system and that outlined in
the most recent United States proposal would be a useful addition
to the current policy debate over the structure of a compensation
14
system for the United States.
Part I of this Note presents an overview of the proposed system
for compensation of victims of hazardous substance pollution in the
United States.' 5 The focus will be on cost allocation, eligibility, the
adequacy of compensation and the exclusivity of the remedy,16 as

11. H.R. 4813, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
12. See, e.g., F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED,

S. TAYLOR & R. STEVENSON, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT TtROUCti ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 49 (1977) (compensation in East

Germany for victims of air pollution) [hereinafter cited as F. ANDERSON & A. KNEESE]; ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN SWEDEN 15-16 (1981) (primarily judicial action for compensation); J. SWAIGEN, COMPENSATION OF POLLUTION VICTIMS
(1981) (discussing Canadian and foreign pollution damage legislation); Theim,
Environmental Damage Funds, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., Compensation
for Pollution Damage 151-56 (1981) (discussing Dutch air pollution fund).
13. See Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law, Law No. 111 of 1973
(Japan) (amended 1974). Cf. supra note 12 and accompanying text (citing other less comprehensive systems in other countries).
14. The comparison with Japan serves several purposes. First, as one of the few countries to have enacted a comprehensive compensation system, cf. supra note 12 and accompanying text, Japan is an available model for evaluation and comparison. Second, the admiration in the United States for Japan's consensus building nonlitigious society makes
examinations of their legal system useful as well. See Another Way, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 22,
1982, at 14, col. 1. Third, the Japanese system is a product of its development: it was tailored
to particular crisis situations. See GOV'T OF JAPAN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF JAPAN, 1, 23843 (1976). An analysis of the Japanese system's problems as a compensatory system could
prevent a similar pattern of development in the United States. By not awaiting further
hazardous waste crises to spur legislation, a system in the United States could be developed in
a more objective atmosphere.
15. See infra notes 20-66 and accompanying text.
16. Together these factors define the outline of a compensation system: who pays for the
compensation, see, e.g., Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 6, at 933-34, who is compensated, id.
at 938-40, what injuries are compensated, id. at 935-37, and how the system relates to the
IN CANADA

504

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:501

17
these factors reflect the goals of compensation and deterrence.
Part II describes the Japanese system and experience with these
factors.18 In Part III, the United States proposal is evaluated in light
of the Japanese law and the Japanese experience under the law.' 9
The two systems are then evaluated in terms of the twin goals of
compensation and deterrence. Analysis of the different approaches
shows a stress on compensation in the United States proposal, and a
mix of compensation and deterrence under the Japanese law. This
Note concludes that in the field of hazardous substance pollution
the goal of compensation should outweigh the goal of deterrence.
The United States proposal reflects this preference.

I. THE PROPOSED COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. Current United States Law and the Development of the
Proposed System
Several procedural and substantive hurdles currently face potential plaintiffs injured by exposure to hazardous substances in the
United States. 20 For example, a statute of limitations that begins to
2
run from the date of exposure may bar a victim's cause of action, '

existing judicial system of compensation, id. at 932-33. They are relevant to the design of
most compensation systems. Id. at 928-40.
17. See generally J. SWAIGEN, supra note 12, at 9-14 (explaining goals of fair, fast, full
compensation and pollution abatement); Pfennigstorf, Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 347 (development of goals of systems on
deterrence or compensation). See also Abraham, Cost Internalization,Insurance, and Toxic
Tort Compensation Funds, 2 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 123, 124 (1982) (compensate those
injured and promote care and safety by deterrence).
18. See infra notes 67-120 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 121-244 and accompanying text.
20. Rheingold & Jacobsen, The Toxic Tort Cause of Action: Law and Procedure, in
Toxic TORTs 1, 34-35 (P. Rheingold, N. Landau & M. Canavan eds. 1977).
21. Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVTL.
L. REv. 133, 146-53 (1980); Note, Denial of A Remedy: Former Residents of Hazardous
Waste Sites and New York's Statute of Limitations, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 161 (1982). In
Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244
(1981), a case involving asbestos damage, the New York Court of Appeals held that the
statute of limitations began to run when those claiming injury inhaled the foreign substance.
Id. at 1010, 430 N.E.2d at 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246. The court rejected the argument that
the statute of limitations commenced when the damage was or reasonably should have been
discovered. Id. Therefore, as the dissent pointed out, plaintiffs were barred before they
learned or could have learned that they had been injured by asbestos exposure. Id. at 1011,
430 N.E.2d at 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
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given the unusually long period of latency for diseases arising from
exposure to hazardous substances. 21 Unless the jurisdiction has
adopted a "date of discovery" rule,2 3 the statutory period would
24
likely run before the injury manifested itself.
The greatest obstacle to a toxic tort plaintiff's recovery is establishing the causal connection between exposure to a hazardous
substance and an injury. 25 It is difficult to establish the origin of
chronic diseases with absolute certainty, given the limited extent of
scientific research 26 and the complex causes of many of these nontraumatic injuries and illnesses. 27 In many cases, scientific research
has not clearly established the link between certain diseases and
28
exposure to a toxic substance.
In addition to these hurdles, the prohibitive transaction costs
of hazardous substance tort litigation make such a remedy unaffordable for many victims. 2 The litigation requires great resources

22. Trauberman, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances Pollution: An Analysis of
Existing Federal Statutes, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Trauberman, Compensating Victims]. Cancer, for example, has a latency period of up to 40 years.
Id. Therefore, a victim might not discover the disease until after the right to sue has passed.
Hearings on Victim's Compensation, supra note 10, at 343 (testimony of J. Trauberman).
23. The "discovery" rule has been adopted by 39 states. Trauberman, supra note 6, at
191 n.65. However, even with a discovery rule the plaintiff must still find a causal agent and
responsible defendant, in order to recover. Such a task may be impossible given the amount
of time that has elapsed since the exposure. Id. at 191.
24. Id. at 191-92.
25. Trauberman, Compensating Victims, supra note 22, at 3.
26. Hearings on Victim's Compensation, supra note 10, at 56 (testimony of Rep. J.
LaFalce).
27. Acute injuries range from rashes to death. Chronic injuries include birth defects,
cancers, and lung diseases. See Trauberman, Toxic Torts, supra note 6, at 180. Besides the
long latency of chronic injuries, the fact that environmental and genetic factors can also be
related to these diseases complicates a plaintiff's showing that the exposure caused the injury.
Id. at 180-81.
28. See Toxic Torts Task Group, Am. Paper Inst./Nat'l Forest Prods. Ass'n, Toxic Torts
Briefing Paper 8 (1983). The instances where a relationship is clear are limited. They are
cigarette smoking and lung cancer, coal dust and black lung disease, and asbestosis and
mesotheliomia. Id.
29. See Trauberman, Toxic Torts, supra note 6, at 189; Note, Liability for Generators
of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69 GEo. LJ. 1047,
1060 (1981). One commentator stated: "In possibly analagous situations, for example asbestos
exposure, only one of every three dollars going into tort litigation actually makes it to the
injured party. The rest goes to the system -mostly to plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers and
insurance companies." G. Freeman, Jr., Hazardous Substances Liability and Compensation:
An Overview of the Federal Scene 39 (Nov. 29, 1983) (paper delivered at conference
sponsored by the California Foundation on Energy and the Economy).
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of time and money mainly because scientific expertise is required on
30
both sides.
The Ninety-sixth Congress recognized the need for both an
administrative compensation system and toxic tort reform during
the debate over the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 198031 (CERCLA). CERCLA's "Superfund" was established to finance cleanup of hazardous waste
sites.3 2 Congress omitted provisions for victims' compensation from
CERCLA as a last-minute compromise to ensure passage of the
cleanup provisions.33 However, pursuant to CERCLA's section
301(e), 34 Congress authorized a study group to examine the adequacy of current common law and statutory remedies for victims of
hazardous substance exposure and to recommend revisions in the
law. 35 The study group recommended a two-tier solution: creation
of an administrative compensation system, 36 and reform of the
37
traditional tort cause of action.

30. See Trauberman, Toxic Torts, supra note 6, at 189 n.54. These expenses are
particularly burdensome for an individual victim. For instance, a lawyer representing the
plaintiffs in a toxic tort suit in Woburn, Massachusetts, stated:
A properly taken and thoroughly analyzed well water sample will cost $1,000 to
$3,000. Medical tests and diagnoses can add thousands [of dollars] more. A groundwater study to connect the local dump to the polluted well will run $25,000 and up,
depending on the complexity of the problem. Epidemiological studies to demonstrate that among those exposed to the toxic substances there is a statistically
relevant increased level of the illness suffered by the victim will add $50,000 or
more. Lawyers taking toxic tort cases are anticipating a minimum of $100,000 to
$200,000 in costs just for gathering the scientific and medical information required
to prove a claim.
Hearings on Victim's Compensation, supra note 10, at 108 (testimony of A. Roisman, Esq.).
As a result, smaller claims are shut out of the system. See Trauberman, Toxic Torts, supra
note 6, at 189. Class actions are also difficult, particularly because of strict notice requirements and minimal amounts in controversy. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 282.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981).
32. Id. 88 9631-9633.
33. See, e.g., Hearings on Victim's Compensation, supra note 10, at 42 (testimony of
Rep. E. Markey); Fitzgerald & Machowsky, Superjund II: Compensating Victims of Hazardous Substances, FED. B. NEWS & J., Apr. 1983, at 196; Garrett, Compensating Victims of
Toxic Substances: Issues ConcerningProposed Federal Legislation, 13 ENVTL. L. REP'. 10172
(1983).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e) (Supp. V 1981).
35. Id. § 9651(e)(1), (4)(a).
36. SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GRoUP, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND
DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES 20654 (Comm. Print 1982) (prepared for the Senate Comm. on Env't and Public Works)
[hereinafter cited as 301(E) STUDY GnoUP REPORT].
37. Id. at 255-66.
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During the Ninety-eighth Congress several legislators incorporated the study group's findings and recommendations into five
bills, each allowing for compensation of victims of exposure to
hazardous substances either from an administrative fund or
through a reformed tort action in federal court. 38 Other legislators
30
introduced amendments to the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) and to the bill reauthorizing the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act 40 (RCRA), both of which address only the tier
two causes of action.

41

B. The Proposed Bill
The Proposed Bill was introduced in the second session of the
Ninety-eighth Congress as an amendment to RCRA. 42 The Proposed Bill is a reauthorization of CERCLA, 43 providing for the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and spills. 44 The Proposed Bill also

creates a two-tier approach to compensation. 45 First, it allows people who have been injured by exposure to hazardous substances to
file a claim with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for emergency relief. 46 Second, it creates a federal
47
cause of action for injuries from hazardous substances.
The Proposed Bill allows a victim to seek compensation from
the administrative compensation system or in a civil action, or
both. 48 However, if the victim recovers from the administrative
fund and then pursues the judicial remedy against a responsible

38. See S. 946, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 945, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 917,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S3927-29 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983); H.R. 2582, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2482, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
41. For the offered amendment to the Toxic Substances Control Act, see H.R. 4303,
98th Cong., 1st Ses. (1983). For the amendment to the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act reauthorization, H.R. 2867, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), see 129 CoNC. REc. H5802
(daily ed. July 27, 1983).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
43. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. CERCLA provides authority to collect the
Superfund taxes only until 1985, unless Congress reauthorizes it. 42 U.S.C. § 9653 (Supp. V
1981),
44. H.R. 4813, see. 101, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
45. Id. sees. 202, 402.
46. Id. sec. 202.
47. Id. sec. 402, §§ 1121-1132.
48. Id. sees. 202, 402.
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party, the victim is entitled to recover only for damages in excess of
the administrative award.4 9 The Proposed Bill requires deduction of
compensation for the same injury paid by any collateral source,
public or private, from the administrative compensation or from
recovery in a court action. 50 When a claim is paid from the administrative compensation fund, the government is subrogated to the
victim's rights up to the amount of compensation paid.5 '
The Proposed Bill allows compensation from the administrative compensation fund for disability,5 2 relocation,5 3 and all medical expenses. 54 Victims are to be compensated for lost earnings with
a U.S.$2000 per month maximum for up to five years. 55 Rehabilitation expenses are included in the Proposed Bill 56 as are injuries
occurring prior to birth. 57 The administrative compensation fund,
however, does not provide recovery for pain and suffering.
To be eligible for compensation from the fund, a victim need
only show injury, exposure, and the theoretical possibility that the
exposure caused or significantly contributed to the injury. 58 This
showing creates a rebuttable presumption that the exposure caused
the injury. 59 The administrator of EPA can overcome the presump-

49. Id. sec. 402, § 1132(a).
50. Id. Payment of claims under the administrative system entitles the government to a
lien on collateral recoveries. Id. § 1132(b). The Proposed Bill does not allow any person
eligible for workman's compensation to recover for injuries from hazardous substances in the
administrative compensation system or in court. Id. § 1133.
51. Id. sec. 202, § 1115(a).
52. Id. § 1113(a)(1)(B).
53. Id.§ 1113(a)(1)(C).
54. Id. § 1113(a)(1)(A).
55. Id. § 1113(a)(1)(B).
56. Id. see. 102, § 1101(a)(2). Medical costs include any "rehabilitative programs within
the scope of section 103 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 723)." Id.
57. Id. § 1101(a)(3). Consequently, the Proposed Bill compensates for medical expenses
arising from the teratogenic effects of exposure. Teratogens are substances that damage
developing fetuses, causing birth defects. S. EPSTEIN & L. BROWN, supra note 3, at 36.
Teratogenic effects are a possible latent hazard of mercury poisoning and dioxin contamination and polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) pollution. Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 7-8.
Cadmium is linked to birth defects as well. S. EPSTEIN & L. BROWN, supra note 3, at 225.
58. H.R: 4813, sec. 202, § 1114(b)(1), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
59. Id. To create the presumption, the claimant may utilize a broad range of relevant
evidence not usually admissible in trials. This evidence includes epidemiological studies,
animal studies, and tissue studies. Id. § 1114(c). Epidemiology is the statistical study of
disease occurrence in human populations. Trauberman, Toxic Torts, supra note 6, at 186
n.46. These studies are admitted because proof in environmentally-caused injuries requires
"evidence on the 'frontiers of scientific knowledge.' " Hearings on Victim's Compensation,
supra note 10, at 344 (testimony of J. Trauberman). It is similarly difficult to extrapolate
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tion by establishing, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that the0
6
exposure did not cause or significantly contribute to the injury.
These procedural provisions reduce the victim's burden of establishing causation. 6' The Proposed Bill provides for administrative hearings62 and federal judicial review 63 for the appeal of claims determinations.
The reauthorization of the CERCLA tax scheme provides the
financing for the administrative compensation fund. 64 The Proposed Bill establishes the Hazardous Substance Trust Fund, financed by oil and chemical feedstock taxes and waste disposal
65
taxes.
The Proposed Bill offers an administrative system for compensation in the United States. Because the Japanese system provides a
model for comparison, 66 it will be discussed in the next section.
II. THE JAPANESE LAW FOR COMPENSATING HEALTH
DAMAGE FROM POLLUTION
A. The Development of the Law
Japan's compensation system was enacted in response to
several pollution-related disasters that occurred in Japan during

from the effects of exposures on animals and tissue cultures, the effects of exposure on human
populations. See Trauberman, Toxic Torts, supra note 6, at 186 n.46. While these types of
evidence are imprecise, they may be the only types at all probative of causation that are
available to a claimant. See id. at 218-19.
60. H.R. 4813, sec. 202, § 1114(b)(2), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
61. The civil action in section 402 also creates a rebuttable presumption. See id. sec.
402, § 1123. In court, however, the plaintiff must show more than the possibility that there is
a reasonable likelihood that the exposure caused the injury. The plaintiff must show that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the exposure did cause or significantly contribute to the
injury. Id. see. 402, § 1123. The presumption affects only the burden of going forward with
the case and does not affect the plaintiff's burden of proof. Id. The plaintiff must still prove
his case by a preponderance of the evidence. FED. R. EvIo. 301.
62. H.R. 4813, sec. 202, § 1114(e)(1), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The administrator
awards attorneys fees and expert witness costs to any claimant who prevails in the administrative hearing. Id. § 1114(e)(3).
63. Id. § 1116.
64. See Statement of Honorable James J. Florio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism, Introduction of Superfund Reauthorization Legislation
(Feb. 9, 1984) (introducing H.R. 4813 as the CERCLA reauthorization). CERCLA is funded
mainly by a tax on oil and chemical feedstocks in the form of specified organic chemicals and
certain heavy metals. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(a), (b); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4622 (Supp. V 1981).
65. H.R. 4813, secs. 301, 321, 331, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The waste end fee was
not included in CERCLA as part of its Superfund. See supra note 64.
66. See supra note 13-14 and accompanying text.
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its post-World War II industrial drive.67 Under Japan's civil
69
code, 68 however, victims of these disasters faced problems in court
not unlike those facing their counterparts in the United States today. 70 The absence of judicial remedies forced victims to rely on the
71
inadequate extra-judicial payments made voluntarily by industry.
A statutory attempt 72 at administrative compensation was also inadequate because it provided compensation only for medical costs
and was underfinanced due to limited contributions from industry. 7

The most important impetus, though, behind the current Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law74 (Japanese
Law) was Japan's four major pollution trials. 75 The suits involved

67. See Gresser, The 1973 Japanese Law for the Compensation of Pollution-Related
Health Damage: An Introductory Assessment, 8 LAW JAPAN 91, 97-98 (1975). One disaster
was the outbreak of Minamata disease in the mid-fifties causing pain, paralysis and death. Id.
at 97. The outbreak was traced to effluents from a local fertilizer plant in Minamata Bay. Id.
at 97, 103. Another disaster was the outbreak of respiratory diseases in the mid-sixties in
Yokkaichi, an industrial city of refineries, petrochemical, and power plants. Id. at 97-98. In
Toyama, in 1955, many residents suffered from what came to be known as Itai-Itai disease,
traced to cadmium poisoning. Id. at 98. In 1964, there was a second outbreak of Minimata
disease in Niigata City. Id; see infra note 75 (discussing the diseases).
68. MINPO (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 (Japan).
69. See Gresser, supra note 67, at 100 ("Under the Civil Code, . . . an injured party
bore the entire burden of showing that a polluter's activity (i.e., discharge of pollutants from
a factory) was the direct, scientific cause of the injury.").
70. See supra note 20-30 and accompanying text.
71. See Cresser, supra note 67, at 98-99. These payments, called mimaikin, were
traditional means of compensating victims of accidents. Id. at 98. The payments were
inadequate because of the voluntary nature of the payments, the insufficient amounts of
compensation, and the lack of a deterrent factor. See id. at 99.
72. Law Concerning Special Measures for the Relief of Pollution-Related Victims, Law
No. 90 of 1969 (Japan). For a discussion of this law, see Kanazawa, A System of Relief for
Pollution-Related Injury, 6 LAW JAPAN 65 (1973).
73. See GOVT OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 236-38.
74. Law No. 111 of 1973 (Japan).
75. These are: Judgment of Mar. 20, 1973, Kumamoto Dist. Ct., 696 HANREI JIH5 15
(Kumamoto mercury poisoning case); Judgment of July 29, 1972, Tsu Dist. Ct., Yokkaichi
Branch, 672 HANRE Jui6 30 (Yokkaichi air pollution case); Judgment of Sept. 29, 1971, Niigata
Dist. Ct., 642 HANBEI JR16 96 (Niigata mercury poisoning case); Judgment of June 30, 1971
Toyama Dist. Ct., 635 HANREI JIn 17, aff'd, Judgment of Aug. 9, 1972, Nagoya High Ct.,
Kanazawa Branch, 674 HANREI Ji6 25 (Toyama cadmium poisoning case). For partial
translations of the opinions in English, see J. GREssEn, K. FUJIKURA & A. MORISHIMA,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN 57-63 (Toyama), 67-83 (Niigata), 86-103 (Yokkaichi), 106-24
(Kumamoto) (1981) [hereinafter cited as J. GREssER & K. FUjIKURA]. The cadmium suit was
against the mining company Matsui Kinzoku Kogyo for the cadmium poisoning resulting in
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damages totalling 2262 million yen (roughly U.S.$5,000,000). 76
The courts, in ruling for the plaintiffs, lowered the causation requirements by allowing admission of epidemiological evidence and
raised the standard of care demanded of industry. 77 The Japanese
Diet then enacted legislation holding polluters strictly liable in civil
actions. 7 The new liability standard did not appease victims' advocates because there were still many obstacles to recovery: difficulties in proving causation, long delays, and considerable expense. 79
The higher judicial and statutory standards of liability caused concern among business and industry groups.80 As a result, those
groups also supported the enactment of an administrative compensation system."'
B. The Japanese Law
The Japanese Law creates two classes of regions: Class I regions where air pollution-related diseases are compensated 82 and
Class II regions where diseases related to specific toxic substances
are compensated. 83 The current Class II diseases are Minamata

cases of Itai-Itai (ouch-ouch) disease among the inhabitants of the Jinzu river basin in
Toyama Prefecture. The name derives from the pain suffered by the victims causing them to
yell out "Itai-Itai." GovT OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 239. The mercury suit was against the
Showa Denko Chemical Company for damages from discharges of mercury poisoning causing Minamata disease in Niigata Prefecture. Id. at 238-39. The air pollution suit was against
six different companies in Yokkaichi for damages from air pollution causing respiratory
diseases in Yokkaichi, Id. at 239-40. A second Minamata disease suit was against the Chisso
Corporation, the fertilizer manufacturer which discharged mercury into Minamata Bay in
Kumamoto Prefecture. Id. at 240.
76. The breakdown of the damages awarded is 1470 million yen in the suit against
Chisso in Kumamoto, 200 million yen in Yokkaichi, 530 million yen in Niigata, and 62
million yen in the Itai-Itai disease suit. Gov'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 238-40.
77. Id. at 240-41.
78. Law to Amend Portions of the Air Pollution Control and Water Pollution Control
Law, Law No. 84 of 1972 (Japan).
79. J. GRa ssEa & K. FuJIKURA, supra note 75, at 289.
80. See id. Most threatening to those groups was the Yokkaichi decision, Judgment of
July 24, 1972, Tsu Dist. Ct., Yokkaichi Branch, 672 HANREI JIH5 30, which held the
defendants in that case jointly and severally liable. Id. Thousands of other people suffering
health damage and exposed to air pollution could sue those industries releasing sulfur dioxide.
81. J. GREssER & K. FUjIKURA, supra note 75, at 289. For example, a national industrial
association acted as a spokesman for industry in structuring the program and endorsing the
system that was eventually adopted. F. ANDERSON & A. KNEESE, supra note 12, at 51.
82. Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 2 (Japan).
83. Id.
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disease, 84 Itai-Itai disease,8 5 and chronic arsenic poisoning. 86 There
are presently 41 Class I regions 87 and five Class II regions. 88
The Japanese system addresses the four structural factors of
compensation systems: the relation of the system to judicial remedies; the extent of compensation; the requirements of eligibility;
and the allocation of cost. 8 First, an injured party certified as the
victim of a pollution-related disease and compensated under the
law may still recover in court for any uncompensated injury. 90
Collateral source payments for the same injury, however, are not
permitted if double recovery results. 91 Under the law, a victim may
seek compensation through either workman's compensation,9 2 na94
tional health insurance,9 3 a private settlement with the polluter,
95
or the compensation law.
Second, the Japanese Law lists seven types of expenses for
which compensation is available for certified victims. 9 6 Compensa-

84. ENV'T AGENCY, GOV'T OF JAPAN, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN 1982, at
274 (1983)' (Table 6-1) [hereinafter cited as QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT].
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 273. There were 36,371 victims certified in Class I regions as of April 1976.
GOV'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 260. By the end of 1981, 82,566 victims were certified.
QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84, at 274.
88. QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84, at 274. There were 1581 victims as of
April 1976. GOV'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 260. By the end of 1981, 2054 victims were
certified. See QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84, at 274.
89. See supra note 16.
90. See J. GREsse & K. FujIKURA, supra note 75, at 290. However, because of the law's
structure in allocating responsibility in the two classes, the government cannot be subrogated
to a compensated victim's rights. See Toxic Substance Control Act Amendments: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 363 (1978) (testimony of J. Gresser)
[hereinafter cited as Hearingson TSCA Amendments]. There is no identified polluter in Class
I regions to sue. In Class II regions, the specific polluter pays, eliminating the need for the
government to recover. See Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 62 (Japan).
91. Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 14. (Japan).
92. See J. GRESSER & K. FujIKuRA, supra note 75, at 296.
93. See id.
94. See Aronson, Review Essay: EnvironmentalLaw in Japan, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
135, 159 n.98 (1983).
95. Law No. 111 of 1973 (Japan).
96. Id. art. 3, para. 1. These benefits are: (1) medical care benefits and medical care
expenses; (2) compensation for handicaps; (3) compensation for survivors; (4) lump compen-
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tion is available primarily for medical treatment 7 and disability.9 8
The law does not provide for payments for pain and suffering,99
property damage,10 0 or relocation. 10 1 Certification is valid for a
specific period depending on the disease,10 2 but may be renewed or
03
extended. 1
Third, to be eligible for certification, victims must show that
they lived in, worked in, or commuted into a region' 0 4 already
designated by Cabinet order.'0 5 Class I designation is based on
epidemiological evidence showing a high incidence of diseases related to air pollution.'0 6 In Class II areas, the government has
established the causal relation between the specific disease and the
specific toxic substance. 107 Those suffering from the designated diseases are certified by local officials 8 on the advice of local certification councils. 0 There is no time limit for someone suffering
health damage to apply for certification. 10 In addition, denial of
certification is reviewable through an administrative appeals proc-

sation payment for survivors: (5) child compensation allowance; (6) medical care allowance;
and (7) funeral expenses. Id.
97. Id. arts. 19-24. Medical care is fully reimbursed. Id. art. 19, para. 1. Local
governments provide rehabilitation programs. Id. art. 46.
98. See id. arts. 25-28. The amount recovered for disability is not based on actual
income, but on a formula depending on the extent of disability and a percentage of the
average wage of age and sex groups. See id. art. 26, para. 1. Other compensation includes
two methods of allocating survivor's benefits. See id. arts. 29-38 (Japan). There is a method of
allocating benefits to children who are certified as victims. See id. art. 39. Payments are
provided for an allowance for the expenses involved in attaining medical care and for
funerals. See Id. arts. 40, 41. Clearly, for those who are certified as victims, the Japanese
Law provides broad physical health-related compensation.
99. See J. GP~ssEa & K. FuJIKURA, supra note 75, at 295.
100, Id.
101, The law, however, does provide for relocation to rehabilitation programs in
"nonpolluted areas elsewhere." Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 46, para 1. (Japan). These
programs are usually temporary. Interview with Bruce Aronson, Esq. (Apr. 20, 1984).
102. Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 7 (Japan). The Japanese Cabinet sets the period of
validity for designated diseases. Id. para. 1.
103. Id. art. 8. Class II certification is permanent. Interview with Bruce Aronson, Esq.
(Apr. 20, 1984).
104. Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 4 (Japan).
105. Id. art. 2.
106. See GOV'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 245-46.
107. See id. at 246-47.
108. Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 4 (Japan).
109. Id. arts. 44-45.
110. See J. SWAICEN,. supra note 12, at 69.
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ess"' and, after administrative remedies are exhausted, through
2
appeal to the courts."
Fourth, the Japanese Law finances Class I compensation payments from the proceeds of auto weight taxes and a levy on industries that emit sulfur dioxide.1 3 Because no specific source is identified, sulfur dioxide-emitting industries share a collective
responsibility. Industries emitting sulfur dioxide within a Class I
area are taxed at an average rate nine times that of industries
outside the area."14 Because a specific polluter is identified in Class
II areas, 1 5 victims in those regions are paid directly by the polluter. 6 In both Class I and Class II regions, a joint government
and industry association collects the funds," i7 then distributes to
local governments the amounts necessary to compensate victims or
reimburse local medical establishments.1 8 The law also provides
for rehabilitation programs funded partly by the pollution levies
and partly by the government's general revenues." 9 General reve20
nues also finance the administrative costs of the association.
III. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
A. Structure and Goals of Compensation Systems
Both the United States and Japanese administrative compensation systems were developed to provide alternatives to inadequate
tort liability systems. 12' Compensation systems, like the tort liability

111. Law No. 111 of 1973, arts. 106-135 (Japan).
112. See id.art. 108.
113. See id. arts. 49-62. "The polluters group is divided into two sub-groups: stationary
sources of pollutants, such as large factories and places of business, and mobile sources of
pollutants, such as the large varieties of motor vehicles." Gov'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at
255. Auto taxes account for 20% of the Class I payments, while the mining-manufacturing
industries and power stations account for 80% of the Class I payments, based on the ratio of
emitted pollutants. See id. at 255-58.
114. COV'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 255.
115. Id.at 258.
116. Id.
117. The association is called the Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation
Association. Law No. 111 of 1973, arts. 68-105 (Japan).
118. Id.
119. Id.art. 49.
120. Id. art. 97.
121. See J. GEssER & K. FUJIKURA, supra note 75, at 289. H.R. 4813, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984) and its predecessor bill, H.R. 2582, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.(1983), stem from the
conclusions and recommendations of the 301(e) study group report, 301(E) STUDY GROUP
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systems they partially replace, can be developed to compensate
2
The structure of a compensainjury and deter injurious behavior. 12
tion system can stress one of these goals.
The goal of compensation is to provide assistance to those for
whom barriers would otherwise preclude recovery. 123 The loss is
more than the victim should be expected to bear, no matter how it
was caused.
Deterrence requires a firm-specific remedy. Such a remedy is
created by imposing the costs of harmful behavior on the individual
firm responsible for that behavior, thus providing a financial incentive for firms to abate the pollution. 24 Effective deterrence requires
identification of individual polluting firms and allocation of the
costs of hazardous substance injuries to them. Administrative compensation systems, however, can perform these functions no better
than traditional tort systems.
A system that provides some deterrence is attractive for several
reasons. It would ultimately reduce the number of victims by abating hazardous waste pollution, thereby benefitting a larger
group. 25 In addition, it is morally more attractive to associate
liability with a specific polluter than to diffuse it among a number
of potentially innocent firms. 126 It is also economically more efficient to assign economic costs to those firms responsible for the
costs. 127

supra note 36. See Hearings on Victim's Compensation, supra note 10, at 42
(testimony of Rep. E. Markey).
122. Abraham, supra note 17, at 124.
123. See Pfennigstorf, supra note 17, at 365.
124. J. SWAICEN, supra note 12, at 9-11.
125. See id. at 11-13. Requiring the pollutor to pay means that profits are maximized by
avoiding hazardous waste accidents and injuries. Comment, Compensating Hazardous
Waste Victims: RCRA Insurance Regulations and a Not So "Super" Fund Act, 11 EN TL. L.
689, 695 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims].
The industry creating the dangers has an incentive to prevent future injuries and thereby
reduce costs. Id. The result would be fewer accidents and less pollution to society as a whole.
REPORT,

Id.
126. See J. SWAIGEN, supra note 12, at 11-13. Those who stand to profit from riskcreating activities should be responsible if any harm arises from their activities. Id.
127. Note, Toxic Substance Contamination: The Risk-Benefit Approach to Causation
Analysis, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 53, 68 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Toxic Substance
Contamination]. When costs are not internalized, resources are misallocated because pollution-causing products are underpriced in relation to products created without causing pollution. Comment, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims, supra note 125, at 695. See
generally R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW, 139-210 (1976) (overview of economic
aspects of tort liability).
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A system stressing compensation, however, is almost a necessity in this field because an alternative system stressing both compensation and deterrence would be limited to injuries where a
hazardous substance and a firm responsible for that substance could
be identified.1 28 In such a mixed system, victims of injuries where
substances and firms were not identified would be denied compensation.
Consequently, the moral arguments for compensating innocent victims of hazardous substances quickly and inexpensively are
stronger than for deterring identifiable firms from polluting by
making them absorb the costs.12 Moreover, it is difficult to reliably
assign physical injury costs to firms responsible for these costs given
the difficulties of establishing causation. The optimal hazardous
substance compensation fund should stress the compensation goal.
The Proposed Bill for victims' compensation in the United
States stresses compensation and minimizes, without completely
eliminating, an emphasis on deterrence.130 The Japanese system, on
the other hand, is a mixed system of compensation and deterrence. 1 3' The result in Japan has been a system limited to identified
hazardous substances coming from certain firms and causing specified injuries.132 An analysis of the four structural factors described
above 133 illustrates the distinction between the two systems and
provides guidelines for the design of a desirable compensation sys34
tem for victims of hazardous substance pollution.
B. Analysis of Four Factors
1. Relationship to Judicial Remedies
The first issue of analysis of the two systems is the relationship
of the administrative system to the judicial system. The question is

128. J. SWAIGEN, supra note 12, at 11.
129. Because many persons and groups benefit from the industrial processes which
produce the hazardous substances, costs should be spread to concentrate on compensating
victims rather than deterring pollutors. Id. at 9.
130. See generally H.R. 4813, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
131. See generally Law No. 111 of 1973 (Japan).
132. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
133. These factors are the relation to the judicial remedy, damages compensated,
eligibility, and cost allocation. See supra note 16.
134. See injra notes 135-244 and accompanying text.
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whether the victim should have access to both remedies, or whether
an exclusive choice should be required.
The compensation goal requires that victims not fully compensated from the administrative compensation fund retain the right to
sue directly the firms allegedly responsible for their damages. 35
The deterrent goal requires polluters to pay the full cost of any
6
damages they cause.13

If the law does not allow a victim inadequately compensated
by the quicker administrative system to pursue a remedy against a
polluter in a civil action, 37 then the system loses the deterrent
factor. 1 38 In order to achieve deterrence and adequate compensation, a system should not require exclusive remedies.
However, industry and business critics of nonexclusive remedies argue that such a system would provide a fund for subsidized
litigation against them.13 Such critics fear that plaintiffs would
reap a windfall by using the award from the compensation system
0
to fund a subsequent lawsuit.14

135. J. SWAIGEN, supra note 12, at 10. See also Gaskins, Tort Reform in the Welfare
State: The New Zealand Accident CompensationAct, 18 OSGOOnE HALL L.J. 238, 240 (1980)
(compensation seeks to restore a victim to the status quo).
136. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
137. The subrogation rights of the administrative fund are equally important to the
deterrent aspect. "To achieve the deterrent goal, the administrators of the fund should have
the authority, and perhaps even a duty, to sue the person alleged responsible . . . to recover
payments made out of the fund." J. SWAICEN, supra note 12, at 10. A fund which forces a
choice of remedies and does not provide for subrogation would relieve a tortfeasor of liability
once a victim received compensation for injuries caused by the tortfeasor. Abraham, supra
note 17, at 135.
138. A cause of action would still exist but not in tandem with the compensation system.
The victim would have to choose one or the other. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 6, at
932-33 (proposing a compensation fund as exclusive remedy but only on assumption that
victim made whole by proposed fund). See also Trauberman, Toxic Torts, supra note 6, at
245 (exclusive remedy lowers transaction costs).
139. See Garrett, supra note 33, at 10175; American Ins. Ass'n, Preliminary Paper on
Proposed Hazardous Substance Victim Compensation Legislation, reprinted in Hearings on
Victim's Compensation, supra note 10, at 420, 456-59; Leslie Cheek, III, Statement Before
the House Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation. Concerning Compensation of Persons Alleging Injuries or Diseases Resulting
from Exposure to Hazardous Substances 12-14 (July 27, 1983) (available from Crum & Foster
Ins. Cos., Washington,D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Cheek Statement].
140. Cheek Statement, supra note 139, at 12-13. However, the 301(e) study group
recommended that a claimant in the administrative system also have access to the tort claim
in court. 301(E) STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 36, at 197. To deter claimants from using
both remedies frivolously, the study group also recommended that the judge be permitted to
impose costs on the plaintiffs not recovering at least 25% more in court than from the

518

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:501

Both the Japanese Law' 4 ' and the Proposed Bill in the United
States 4 2 allow a victim who has received compensation in the
administrative system to pursue a civil action for any uncompensated injuries. 4 ' From the compensatory standpoint, neither country's administrative system provides for payments for pain and
suffering or other damages such as genetic damage, infertility, or
property damage. 4 4 The United States' Proposed Bill does not pro45
vide compensation for long-term disability beyond five years.
4
6
Such recoveries are available only in civil actions. 1
From the deterrent standpoint, the nonexclusive remedy system would provide greater deterrence in the United States than in
Japan. The civil action in the United States would be the most
47
direct way to have the responsible polluter pay for the damage.1
In the Japanese system, deterrence is more a part of the administra48
tive system because of its collection of levies against polluters.

administrative system. Id. at 202. Dissenters in the 301(e) study group felt that a plaintiff
must choose between the administrative and judicial remedies. See id.at 286. They felt that a
compensated claimant should be allowed to sue only if he could show in a court hearing that
barring a tort action because of administrative compensation would be unconscionable and
that special circumstances warranted the lawsuit. Id. at 287-88.
141. Law No. 111 of 1973 (Japan).
142. H.R. 4813, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
143. See supra notes 46-47, 90 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 52-57 (Proposed Bill), 96-102 (Japanese Law) and accompanying
text. These injuries might result from exposure to hazardous wastes. SIx CASE STUDIES, supra
note 3, at 7-8. For example, in Alabama, polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) leaked into Lake
Weiss and Coosa river, damaging fisheries and local bait and tackle shops. Id. The damages
suffered by commercial fishermen and owners of businesses that related to recreational use of
the waters was not quantified. Id. at 74. However, as an indicator of the damage, in one
year, the state of Alabama took in U.S.$35,000 less from decreased sales of fishing licenses.
Id. In Michigan, toxic chlorinated hydrocarbons in the groundwater led to concerns of
mutagenic effects. Id. at 7. Trichloroethylene, found in domestic wells in the area, may cause
mutations, along with other latent effects. See id. at 225. In addition, according to the New
York State Department of Health, "'t]he sensitivity of the human reproductive process to
toxic chemical exposure is well established. . . .It is also known that many chemicals are
hazardous to the conceptus of lower animals, depending on dosage, route of administration
and stage of gestation." LOVE CANAL, supra note 3, at 23. See also S. EPSTEIN & L. BROWN,
supra note 3, at 26, 375 (impact of PCB's and their by-products on fertility).
145. H.R. 4813, supra note 11, sec. 202, § 1113(a)(1)(B).
146. See, e.g., Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 43 (income losses faced by victims of
exposure).
147. See Note, Toxic Substance Contamination,supra note 127, at 68.
148. See Gov'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 253.
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The deterrent aspect of a nonbinding choice of remedies is less
important, particularly in Class II regions,1 49 where liable parties
are identified and pay for the compensation of the victim directly. 150
The Japanese system, while allowing for recovery of uncompensated injuries and retaining the deterrent aspect of civil liability,
has not resulted in an increase in litigation.' 5' In fact, most suits
brought since the law's implementation have been against the government challenging the administration of cleanup programs, de53
lays in compensation,1 52 or the appeals of uncertified plaintiffs.
Several factors may explain this result. First, the cultural norms of
Japan stress consensus and generally inhibit disputes in court.'5

149. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
150. See GOV'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 258.
151. See J. GREssE & K. FujiKuRA, supra note 75, at 315.
152. In one of the early actions, 372 victims charged that the local government had been
grossly negligent in processing applications for compensation. The court found for the
plaintiffs. Id. at 314. In another suit, Minimata disease victims sued the government and
private companies over plans for the cleanup of Minamata Bay. Id. In one major suit, 100
certified victims in Kawasaki filed suit for damages for health injury against the government
and private and public corporations. Aronson, supra note 94, at 160 n.100. This litigation
came after two other suits were brought by certified victims in the same Class I area. J.
GRESsER & K. FujIKUrA, supra note 75, at 315. These were among the most publicized of the
suits arising after implementation of the Japanese Law. Id. at 314.
153. Most other suits have been by uncertified victims challenging the certification
process, particularly in Class II cases. See Aronson, supra note 94, at 166. For example,
recent Class II litigation involves plaintiffs who were unsuccessful applicants for certification.
Id. at 166 n.121. The plaintiffs were angered by the denial of certification: "The basic thrust
of the litigation is to bypass (and attack) the Compensation Law's certification standards and
procedures in Class II areas." Id. In Minimata in 1980, 85 plaintiffs, all uncertified as
Minamata victims under the Japanese Law, sought to establish liability on the part of the
prefectural and national governments for harm caused by their failure to regulate the
polluter's discharge. Id. at 160 n.100. The plaintiffs named the polluter as a co-defendant.
Id.
Despite the low incidence of litigation, the number of administrative appeals has
increased. By the end of March 1977, uncertified claimants had filed eight Class I grievances
and 41 Class II grievances with the Pollution-Relation Health Damage Compensation Grievance Board (the Grievance Board) and 154 victims of Minamata disease had appealed to the
Director General of the Environment Agency. J. GREssER & K. FuJ1KurA, supra note 75, at
314. By the end of March 1982, the number of grievances had risen to 62 cases in Class I
regions and 364 cases in Class II regions. QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84, at
278. By the end of March 1982, 526 people from the Minamata Bay area had filed grievances
with the Director General of the Environment Agency for review of the prefectural governor's decision of nonapplicability of the Japanese Law. Id. at 282.
154. See J. GaEssER & K. FUJIKURA, supra note 75, at 315. In parts of the Orient,
litigation is frowned upon as a shameful last resort, the use of which signifies failure to settle
by friendlier means. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 29 (1982). In
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The purpose of the Japanese Law is to absorb grievances, not to
facilitate court actions. 55 Second, the Japanese have used other
political and nonjudicial devices to express grievances in environmental disputes. 156 Third, the structure of the Japanese Law does
not encourage suits.1 57 In Class I areas no specific polluter is identified. Thus, the requirement that firms pay a levy implicates all
industries. 58 Unless a plaintiff sues under a theory of joint and
59
several liability, he is often unable to identify a responsible party.
Bringing a suit would therefore be difficult. In Class II areas, the
polluter is identified and pays the compensation, thereby limiting
the deterrent effect of a civil remedy.160 More importantly, the law
may curtail litigation because it does not specify whether certification is admissible in later court actions.' The courts may require
the plaintiff to establish the causal relationship of exposure and
12
injury without putting his or her certified status into evidence.

Oriental thought, lawsuits are selfish disruptions of the natural harmony of human affairs.
Id. (discussing Asian law in general). But see Ramseyer, Japan's Myth of Non-Litigiousness,
NAT'L L.J., July 4, 1983, at 36, col. 1 (lack of litigation in Japan due to, among other reasons,
dearth of lawyers and not national culture).
155. See J. GnEssER & K. FujIKuRA, supra note 75, at 314. It has been noted that:
Court trials are, by nature, conflictual processes in which plaintiffs and defendants
fight, and in which one of them loses-case, money, and face. In a country where
the desire for mutual respect and trust is so great, trials are socially disruptive, and it
is not surprising that other ways have been devised to settle conflicts, or rather to
suppress them. Thus, in passing the Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law [Law No. 111 of 1973], the Government was not only trying to ensure that
pollutees would be compensated more quickly, more fully and more surely than
they would have been by the courts; the Government was also avoiding open
conflicts.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN JAPAN 48-49 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as OECD1].
156. See J. GRcssER & K. FUJIKURA, supra note 75, at 315. On February 24, 1977, angry
victims of Minamata disease occupied the Environment Agency offices to protest the government failure to provide effective compensation. Id. at 314. The use of these devicesdemonstrations, sit-ins, and petitions-may stem from feelings of alienation from the officially authorized procedures of legal remedies. Id. at 315. For example, demonstrations,
often violent, followed government decisions to build a new airport for Tokyo. Hase, Japan's
Growing Environmental Movement, ENV'T, Mar. 1981, at 14, 20.
157. See Gresser, supra note 67, at 127-28.

158. See
159.
160.
damages.
161.
162.

Gov'T OF JAPAN,

supra note 14, at 254.

See id. ("no clear cut link between a polluter and the occurrence of a ... disease").
Id. at 258. The deterrent is part of the system's cost allocation: the polluter pays for
See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
See Gresser, supra note 67, at 110 n.78.
Id. at 110.
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Also, because double recovery from collateral sources is not permitted under the Japanese Law, 6 3 there is no windfall recovery to use
as a litigation fund. The victim is compensated primarily for out-ofpocket medical expenses164 and disability' 5 by the compensation
system.
Despite the Japanese experience with nonexclusive remedies,
the Proposed Bill raises the possibility of increased litigation.16 6 For
example, the short-term nature of the disability payment, lasting
for only five years, 6 7 may necessitate that the victim eventually
look elsewhere for compensation.6 8 In addition, the low eligibility
requirement for compensation in the administrative system' 6 9 and
the use of rebuttable presumptions in the federal cause of action170
may encourage a victim compensated by the fund to seek additional
compensation in the judicial system.
There are instances, however, where the structure of the Proposed Bill may inhibit litigation, in a fashion similar to the Japanese

163. See supra note 91-92 and accompanying text.
164. Law No. 111 of 1973, arts. 19-24 (Japan).
165. Id. arts. 25-28.
166. Certainly, the differences between the cultures and legal structures of the United
States and Japan make a comparison on the issue of litigiousness tenuous. See Upham,
Litigation and Moral Consciousness in Japan: An Interpretative Analysis of Four Japanese
Pollution Suits, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 579, 579-81 (1976).
167. H.R. 4813, see. 202, § 1113(a)(1)(B), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
168. In comparison, other fund proposals in the United States do not limit the disability
payments. See H.R. 2582, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 101, § 9013(a) (1983) (compensation
allowed is two-thirds of lost wages up to U.S.$2,000 per month); S. 946, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3 (1983) (also would allow two-thirds of lost wages up to U.S.$2,000 per month); S. 917,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1983) (no limit). See also 301 (E) STUOY GaouP REPORT, supra note
36, at 234 (recommending two-thirds of lost wages up to U.S.$2,000 per month); Soble, supra
note 6, at 733-34 (no limit in proposed model statute). See also Model Statute § 206(e), (g)
(1983) (Envtl. L. Inst.), reprinted in Trauberman, Toxic Torts, supra note 6, at 265-66
(proposed model statute for compensating victims of hazardous substance pollution recommending payment amounts based on level of disability). But see H.R. 2482, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 307(a) (1983) (maximum aggregate award of U.S.$50,000 in benefits).
169. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
170. H.R. 4813, sec. 402, § 1123, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The 301(e) study group
came out against the use of statutory rebuttable presumptions in plenary tort actions and felt
that development of such presumptions should be left to state law. 301(E) STUDY GiOUP
REPORT, supra note 36, at 260. Both H.R. 2582, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), and the
Environmental Law Institute Model Statute, allow rebuttable presumptions only in the "tier
one" administrative compensation system. H.R. 2582, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 101, §
9014(b) (1983); Model Statute, supra note 168, §§ 205(c), § 301, reprinted in Trauberman,
Toxic Torts, supra note 6, at 263-64, 287-89.
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system. By barring double recovery,17 1 the law discourages a vic17 2
tim's "gambling" of the compensation award on a tort action.
The Proposed Bill, moreover, bars the plaintiff from introducing
the EPA administrator's finding that the plaintiff was eligible for
compensation. 1 73 In addition, the Proposed Bill does not authorize
the use of the same broad types of evidence in court that are
available in the administrative hearing.174 As a result, the Proposed
Bill contains structural discouragements to unnecessary litigation.
Nonexclusive remedies should be allowed for victims of hazardous substance exposure in order to serve the goals of both compensation and deterrence. Despite fears of increased litigation in
the United States, a system of nonexclusive remedies has not overwhelmed the Japanese courts with toxic tort litigation. Changing
the Proposed Bill to extend the period of disability compensation
and removing the rebuttable presumptions in the federal cause of
action would reduce the limited statutory encouragement of toxic
tort suits.
2. Damages Compensable
The types of damages for which compensation may be recovered is the second important factor of comparison. Under both the
Japanese Law and the Proposed Bill, the administrative systems

171. The Proposed Bill bars collateral source recovery from public or private sources for
the same injury. H.R. 4813, sec. 402, § 1132, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984). Section 1132
provides that recoveries obtained from other administrative or court proceedings, settlements
from any other government program, or from any insurance policy will be deducted from
compensation awards from the administrative system or the courts. Id.
172. See id. § 1132(a). Thus, as in Japan, there are no windfalls or double recoveries
allowed from collateral sources. See id. The award from the compensation fund would pay
for out-of-pocket medical expenses, disability and relocation but not for litigation. See supra
notes 52-54 and accompanying text. Furthermore, payment of claims under the administrative system entitles the United States government to a lien on any collateral recoveries. H.R.
4813, sec. 402, § 1132(b), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
173. H.R. 4813, sec. 402, § 1123(a). Unlike the Japanese Law, which does not address
the issue, supra note 161 and accompanying text, the Proposed Bill makes it clear that the
plaintiff cannot use his or her status as a compensated victim as a sword in litigation. See
H.R. 4813, sec. 402, § 112 3(a), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Consequently, the plaintiff
receives no evidentiary benefit in court for his status as a compensated victim. The Proposed
Bill, by the same provision, does not permit the defendant to introduce the results of any
proceeding where the plaintiff was denied or granted eligibility. Id.
174. Compare H.R. 4813, sec. 402, § 1123, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (judicial action)
with id. see. 202, § 1114(c) (administrative scheme). In the administrative system, victims are
allowed to rely on scientific evidence that tends to show a correlation between exposure to a
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compensate primarily for disability and all medical expenses. 175
However, only the United States proposal provides compensation
176
for relocation costs.
Both systems are less than optimal from the compensatory
standpoint, however, because they fail to compensate for property
damage177 and pain and suffering. 178 Although monetary assessment of these injuries would be difficult,179 an adequate compensation scheme would take them into account.1 80
If an administrative system provides an exclusive remedy, and
does not compensate for these damages, the claimant will not be
fully compensated for these damages. A schedule of payments' 81 for

hazardous substance and disease. Id. sec. 202, § 1114(c). Such a cause and effect showing
through animal studies, tissue culture studies, micro-organism studies, and statistical (epidemiological) studies of incidence and disease is permitted to establish the victim's rebuttable
presumption that the exposure could have caused the injury. Id.
175. See id. § 1113(a)(1)(A), (B); Law No. 111 of 1973, arts. 19-41 (Japan).
176. H.R. 4813, sec. 202, § 1113(a)(1)(C)(ii), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The Japanese
Law provides relocation costs only when required for medical reasons. See Law No. 111 of
1973, art. 46, para. 1 (Japan) (local officials may undertake programs for medical care in
nonpolluted areas elsewhere). See supra note 101.
177. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 6, at 937. The Japanese system does not provide
for loss of earnings resulting from damage other than impaired health. J. SWAIGEN, supra
note 12, at 71. There is no administrative compensation for destruction of property or loss of
trade. Id. In Japan, the problem of contamination of crops and fisheries could be substantial.
See J. GREssER & K. FujIKURA, supra note 75, at 295 (issue of property damage to farms and
fisheries arose in drafting of Japanese Law).
178. See Hearings on Victim's Compensation, supra note 10, at 254. Such losses are
hard to quantify. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, as one witness at
congressional victim's compensation hearings noted: "[T]he pain and suffering of a man
dying of cancer or watching a child die of leukemia is not speculative or hypothetical."
Hearingson Victim's Compensation, supra note 10, at 254 (testimony of A. Roisman, Esq.).
See also Anderson, The Case for Statutory Compensation, ENVTrL. F., Mar. 1983, at 24. In
addition, Anderson supports compensation coverage for various forms of neuropathology and
fear of future cancer or of transmission of genetic injury to future generations. Id. The
argument for compensating fear of future cancer is a difficult one because cancer accounts for
nearly 20% of the deaths in the United States. M. BROWN, supra note 3, at 329. Under this
argument, people in contact with any carcinogen should be compensated. However, because
so many hazardous substances have been linked to cancer, it is a definite consideration for
people exposed to them. See S. EPSTEIN & L. BROWN, supra note 3, at 36.
179. See Anderson, supra note 178, at 25. See also O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish
Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants'Attorneys'
Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 333, 334 ("Setting a dollar value on nonpecuniary loss is an
uncertain proposition.").
180. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
181. See Anderson, supra note 178, at 24. Schedules for fund-financed payments of nonpecuniary losses would provide standardization of these payments. See Trauberman, Toxic
Torts, supra note 6, at 244 n.433.
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such damages, therefore, should be established. At the very least,
the claimants should have access to a civil action for their recov82

ery. 1

An additional problem with the Proposed Bill is that it limits
compensation by allowing disability payments for a maximum period of five years.' 8 3 Limiting relief to the short-term in this way
may encourage victims to litigate to recover for excess damages
thereafter. Compensation for a longer period might not only decrease the necessity to litigate but also would be more equitable to
victims who are unable to litigate due to a lack of either resources or
84
an identifiable and solvent defendant.

The Japanese system, while not specifying a limited time for
payments, limits recovery to injuries included in the Class I and

Class II designations. 185 This limitation fails to compensate for
other forms of health damage that are related to pollution and

hazardous substances,1 6 such as cancer and other chronic dis87
eases.
The Proposed Bill thus presents a better alternative. However,
it should be changed to allow for long term disability and to provide a schedule for nonpecuniary damages.
3. Eligibility
The third critical factor of comparison is eligibility for compensation. Both the Japanese Law and the United States Proposed
Bill reduce the plaintiff's burden of establishing causation.
In Japan, victims of designated diseases in designated areas
must establish eligibility for compensation for pollution-related
health damage by an examination before a local Health Damage

182. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
183. H.R. 4813, sec. 202, § 1113(a)(1)(B), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
184. See 301(E) STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 36, at 65.
185. See supra note 82-86 and accompanying text.
186. The Japanese Law currently compensates victims in Class II only for the diseases
resulting from exposure to mercury, cadmium, and arsenic. See QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84, at 278-86. The Japanese Law compensates in Class I areas only for
respiratory diseases resulting from exposure to air pollution. See id. at 278. The law does not
currently compensate for carcinogenic exposures to dioxins or other toxic chemicals.
187. Hearings on TSCA Amendments, supra note 90, at 367 (testimony of J. Gresser).
Since 1974, when the Japanese Law was implemented, see QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 84, at 273, there have been no designations of additional Class II regions. See id.
at 278-80.
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Certification Council.' 88 Victims showing specific symptoms relating to the designated diseases are compensated. 8 9 The Japanese
system, in Class I areas, requires identification of a disease associated with particular types of firms, 1 0 and in Class II, a disease
associated with a specific polluter.' 9 ' The Japanese system diminishes the compensation goal because the injured party receives compensation only for certain diseases related to pollution sources in the
designated areas.
While the Japanese system allows for expansion of the law to
encompass more diseases, areas, and pollution sources, 1 9 2 it currently limits the designations to certain types of water and air
pollution in specified areas.19 3 Any additions would require a political decision 194 which raises the problems of abuse of discretion and
other political considerations. 9 5 A compensatory system, once enacted, should not make compensation dependent on political factors. 196

The Proposed Bill emphasizes compensation. It provides quick
recovery by lowering the eligibility requirements for a wide range
of potential diseases or injuries.' 9 7 It also provides a greater poten-

188. Law No. 111 of 1973, arts. 4, 44-45 (Japan). The Council consists of medical and
legal experts. Id. art. 45, para. 2. See Aronson, supra note 94, at 164 (council members
evaluate medical and other data for each applicant to determine eligibility for certification).
189. See J. SwAIGEN, supra note 12, at 68. Adherence to symptoms is strict, particularly
in Class II certifications. The problem of victims with aberrant symptoms being uncompensated has grown as cases with the most basic symptoms have already been compensated. J.
GREssEn & K. FUJIKURA, supra note 75, at 293; Aronson, supra note 94, at 167.
190. Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 2, para. I (Japan).
191. Id. art. 2, para. 2. See Aronson, supra note 94, at 163.
192. Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 2 (Japan).
193. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. Nor is it likely to be expanded.
According to Professor Gresser:
[B]ar'ring a new major pollution-related crisis, the Japanese Government will not
expand the present system. No new substances or areas will be designated. There has
been some discussion of cancer in relation to pollution. Should cancer be considered.
[sic] There is no chance in the world that cancer will be designated.
Hearings on TSCA Amendments, supra note 90, at 367 (testimony of J. Gresser).
194. Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 2 (Japan). "While decisions on individual applications
and appeals are open to review by the courts, the designation of diseases and pollution zones
is essentially a political decision." J. SWAICEN, supra note 12, at 71.
195. J. SWAICEN, supra note 12, at 71.
196. Id.
197. H.R. 4813, sec. 102, § 1101(3), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The Proposed Bill
defines physical injury or illness as any serious bodily injury or any other internal or external
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tial of achieving the compensation goal than the Japanese system,
because it does not require identifying specific pollution sources.
Under the Proposed Bill, the victim need show only that there
is reasonable likelihood that exposure of the nature, scope, or magnitude he experienced caused the injury which is the basis of his
claim.'1 8 This very low threshold, coupled with broad evidentiary
allowances,199 stresses compensation but may lead to overinclusivity
by allowing recovery for sufferers of diseases resulting from heredity or diet. 20 0 A requirement that the victim show a "high probability" 20
' that exposure to hazardous substances caused or significantly
eligibility threshold high
contributed to the injury would raise the
202
enough to prevent illegitimate claims.

injury. It does not refer to any specific injury. Id. The range of substances defined as
hazardous, for which the Proposed Bill provides compensation, is also broader than those
substances currently compensable under the Japanese Law. Id. sec. 101(a), § 9001(12); see
supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
198. Id. sec. 202, § 1114(b)(1).
199. Id. § 1114(c).
200. See Mosher, supra note 2, at 121 (Insurance and business groups in the United
States have criticized the use of rebuttable presumptions and low thresholds of causation as
leading to "automatic compensation.") See also Cheek Statement, supra note 139, at 5-7
(compensation funds could lead to "massive overinclusivity" and "national health insurance").
201. See H.R. 2582, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 101, § 9014(b)(1)(C) (1983).
202. The need to show high probability may lead, however, to problems of compensation. For example, if public health authorities had not yet produced health effects documents
establishing the high probability of injury linked to exposure, had not yet collected other
evidence (e.g., epidemiological studies), or if claimants had no access to this information or
evidence, then claimants might not be able to meet the high probability standard for
compensation. This possibility of noncompensation lends support to the argument that any
administrative decision not be a final one. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 6, at 939.
Any inclusivity of natural sufferers, or those who may have contracted the disease
through other factors (e.g., heredity or diet), would be offset by underinclusivity of those
who are legitimately injured but unaware of the exposure or the nexus between the injury
and the exposure. Id. at 940. The result would balance overinclusivity and underinclusivity.
Besides a claimant's ignorance or lack of access to evidence, or the fact that, in Japan
particularly, claimants contracted unusual or less severe symptoms, claimants might not be
compensated because of the overall limits of current etiology. See Gresser, supra note 67, at
121. Atypical disease patterns, for example, might not be acknowledged as stemming from
exposure. Id. Even if causal proof is made easier by the administrative scheme in both
countries, victims may still only recover for what is currently "known." The Proposed Bill
allows greater leeway by not requiring certification of diseases or areas and by using broad
definitions. See supra notes 54, 58-60 and accompanying text.
The scientific limitation on who may be compensated should also balance any overinclusivity caused by compensation of those deemed to be "natural sufferers." In Japan, the
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4. Allocation of Costs
The final critical factor of analysis between the Japanese and
United States solutions to hazardous substance compensation is the
allocation of costs. The Japanese system ensures deterrence by having the polluter pay for the injuries he inflicts.2 0 However, the law
neither deters efficiently nor compensates effectively. The law limits compensation to certain exposures and does not provide for
complete internalization of costs. The Proposed Bill, which finances
the fund mainly from oil and chemical taxes, stresses compensation.
In Class II areas under the Japanese system, the firm responsible for the pollution and the accompanying diseases makes the
compensation payments. 20 4 The diseases and the polluters responsible in Class II areas are identified, and victims could have sued such
polluters directly. 20 5 Although the claimant does not have to establish causation, the system in Class II is causation-based and firmspecific because the government is required to establish the rela206
tionship between the disease and the pollution.
By placing the costs directly on the polluter, the Class II system
resembles a traditional liability system and internalizes the costs of
pollution. 20 ' The system gives industries a financial incentive to
exercise greater care, thereby avoiding responsibility for compensation payments. 20 8 The internalization of costs is not complete, however, because government revenues pay for some of the costs as well
20 9
as the administration of the system.
The Class II system functions as a less burdensome, quicker
mediator between the polluter and the victim than the traditional

likelihood of overinclusivity of natural sufferers is great in Class I areas, such as those victims
with respiratory diseases from causes other than pollution. Aronson, supra note 94, at 163.
On the other hand, Japan's system is also underinclusive because it does not compensate
victims outside of designated areas who may be legitimate victims of exposure (through
means other than having lived or worked in the area, such as through the air or in foodstuffs).
Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 4 (Japan); J. CaEssEa & K. FujIKuaA, supra note 75, at 307.
203. Law No. 111 of 1973, arts. 52, 62 (Japan).
204. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
205. See Gov'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 243.
206. See Law No. 111 of 1973, art. 2, para 2 (Japan).
207. See Cresser, supra note 67, at 128.
208. Comment, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims, supra note 125, at 695.
Profits are maximized by avoiding accidents and injuries. Id.
209. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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court system. 2'0 The result is lower transaction costs. 21' Nevertheless, the fact that the system ties payments to specific firms and to
specific diseases and symptoms limits the compensatory power of
the system and may prevent benefits from reaching victims of
21 2
diseases from other exposures to hazardous substances.
In Class I areas, the allocation of costs is less causation-based
and less firm-specific than in Class II areas. 213 There is a general
collective responsibility among all sulfur dioxide emitting industries. 21 4 Payments are based on a levy tied to the amount of sulfur
dioxide emissions. 21 5 The levy partially meets the deterrent goal by
requiring polluters to pay, thereby creating an incentive to reduce
emissions.2 16 The levy system also partially meets the compensation
goal because it does not tie the rate of the levy to air quality
standards, but to the amount of compensation required by the
2 17
number of certified victims.

210. Cresser, supra note 67, at 119. The Japanese Law removes the delays and uncertainties of earlier judicial and administrative remedies. Id. However, the certification process
is lengthy for Minamata victims in Kumamoto province. The waiting list for certification
contained 2600 applicants in August 1974 under the 1969 Law Concerning Special Measures
for the Relief of Pollution Related Patients, Law No. 90 of 1969 (Japan). ENVIRONMENT
SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 80. By the end of March 1982, that number had swelled to 4697.
QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84, at 282. In February 1979, the Japanese
government enacted the Special Law Concerning Promotion of Certification of Minamata
Disease, Law No. 104 of 1978 (Japan), which allowed those applicants for compensation
under the Japanese Law, who had not received certification, to apply directly to the Director
General of the Environment Agency for relief. QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84,
at 281.
211. By eliminating lengthy court trials and removing the victim's burden of establishing causation, the Japanese Law reduces transaction costs. See supra note 9. Minimizing
transaction cost leads to lower aggregate social costs and greater economic efficiency.
Trauberman, Toxic Torts, supra note 6, at 207.
212. As one commentator points out, other pollutants were also present in Class II
areas. Aronson, supra note 94, at 167 n.126. The Japanese system fails to account for the
possible effects of exposure to a number of pollutants. Id. Pollution from hazardous waste
landfills or hazardous waste spills would have to be designated first. The Japanese system has
not yet addressed multiple source pollution Class II areas. See id. at 167. In addition, the
Japanese limitation on areas and sources of pollution may actually inhibit deterrence among
the larger group of polluters. A limited payment system, therefore, limits the number of
affected polluters. See Gresser, supra note 67, at 127.
213. GOVT OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 245.

214.
215.
216.
217.

OECDI, supra note 155, at 45.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
OECD1, supra note 155, at 47.
See Aronson, supra note 94, at 155-56.
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The mixed system in Class I has led to several problems. First,
while the system is tied to the amount of hazardous emissions and
operates as somewhat of a deterrent and a means of internalization,
the effect of the law on ambient air quality is unclear. Although
sulfur dioxide emissions have decreased, 218 other factors such as an
economic recession and regulatory standards enacted before the
compensation scheme 21'9 have been cited as more likely explanations
for this improvement.

220

A second problem is that due to a backlog of claims for certification the levy rate has increased despite decreasing emissions. This
fact, as well as the inefficiency of tying present levy rates to the
effects of past pollution, 22' undermines the deterrent goal. A financial incentive to decrease pollution requires that the levy decrease as
pollution decreases.
Third, the system in Class I areas has economically inefficient
consequences that run counter to the goals of deterrence and cost
internalization. The levy operates on a linear scale. The amount the
firm must pay rises with emissions, but damages may in fact rise
exponentially. 22 2 Damages caused by the larger polluters may be
greater than the levy reflects. 223 As a result, larger firms might be
paying less than the harm they caused would require. Smaller firms
would, in effect, be subsidizing larger ones. Firms within a designated area are levied at an average rate nine times that of firms
outside the area although firms outside may cause more harm than
those within the area. 22 4 Moreover, industries emitting sulfur dioxide account for 80 % of the fund's revenues, while car owners pay
20 % through an automobile weight tax. 225 Nevertheless, in certain

218. Japan has dramatically reduced its air pollution due to sulfur dioxide. Id. at 157.
The greatest reductions occurred in the early 1970's and the levy was not in effect until 1974.
Id.
219. See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Law, Law No. 138 of 1970 (Japan); Air
Pollution Control Law, Law No. 97 of 1968 (Japan).
220. See F. ANDERSON & A. KNEESE, supra note 12, at 51; Aronson, supra note 94, at
157-58.
221. Critics regarded the practice of charging current polluters to pay for the effects of
past harm as unfair and inefficient. J. GRissa & K. FUJtKURA, supra note 75, at 299. The
government disagreed, arguing that many of the levied firms had been operating for a long
time and present polluters were exposing the public to the same level of risk. Id.
222. See Gresser, supra note 67, at 125.
223. See id. at 125 n.137.
224. J. GRssER & K. FujIKURA, supra note 75, at 303.
225. GOV'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 256.
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areas, mobile polluters may be more pervasive and more harmful
than stationary sources. 22 6 Finally, the levy, primarily for conven227
ience of administration, is tied to sulfur dioxide emissions only.
There is no levy against other harmful pollutants causing respiratory diseases. These results are economically inequitable as sulfur
dioxide polluters may be paying for damages that are the responsibility of others.
Fourth, the law limits the deterrent aspect in Class I areas by
linking the levy primarily to the amount of compensation needed
rather than to the amount of pollution caused. 228 Commentators do
not consider the levy a traditional pollution charge, but rather a
redistributive charge. 229 The levy's primary goal is to finance compensation-not to achieve a reduction in emissions.
Finally, as in Class II areas, the internalization of costs is
deficient in Class 1.230 The polluter does not bear the full cost of the
pollution: the government absorbs some costs. 231 In addition, the
fact that only disability and medical costs are compensated minimizes the internalization of costs by the polluters. 32 Despite these
problems, Class I of the Japanese system attempts to impose the
costs of pollution on the polluting source to a greater extent than the
Proposed Bill.
The Proposed Bill uses the reauthorized Superfund mechanism
for its financing. The Superfund legislation taxes crude oil, chemicals and hazardous wastes at the disposal site. 233 The charges on
2 34
chemicals and oil account for the bulk of the fund's revenue.

226. The Government of Japan estimated that the amount of sulfur dioxide emanating
from stationary sources is 94% of the total sulfur dioxide present in the air. The remainder
emanates from mobile sources. Id. at 255 (Table 6-2). But the adjusted ratio when nitrogen
oxide is added makes the amount of pollution in the air emanating from stationary sources
80% of the total pollution. Id. Even if the ratio correctly reflects the relative contribution of
stationary and mobile sources to the sulfur dioxide pollution nationwide, this does not mean
that the resulting damage from the pollution reflects this proportion. J. Gissm & K.
FUJIKURA, supra note 75, at 303.
227. See GOV'T OF JAPAN, supra note 14, at 257.
228. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
229. Aronson, supra note 94, at 155; ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION AND DEV., POLLUTION CHARGES: AN ASSESSMENT 10-11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as OECD2].
230. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
231. Id.
232. The victim would absorb the costs of damages not compensated. See supra notes
177-78 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
234. H.R. 4813, sees. 301-303, 321-323, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The Proposed Bill
also authorizes federal appropriations in the amount of U.S. $225,000,000 for the first three
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The chemical and oil industries are collectively responsible for
financing the fund. Individual firms are not responsible; the nonpolluter pays along with the polluter. These firms produce the raw
materials used in many of the processes that generate hazardous
wastes and substances. 235 There is no deterrence because the levies
are imposed on the industry as a whole, rather than on those
responsible for the damages. Consequently "clean" or nonpolluting
generators of hazardous wastes are penalized as much as "dirty" or
236
polluting ones.
The Proposed Bill does achieve some cost internalization by
linking fund payments to the sources of hazardous wastes. This
feature shifts the costs from the innocent victims to industries that
create sources of pollution. 237 Without a firm-specific allocation,
however, the result is no more than a redistributive revenue-raising
measure. 238 There is no relation between cost allocation and abatement. As several commentators have noted, this cost spreading
among firms, clean and dirty, may reduce the amount of hazardous
waste produced but not necessarily its toxicity or the potential for
improper disposal .239

fiscal years and in an amount equivalent to 12.5% of all revenues generated during the
second fiscal year. Id. sec. 201, § 9021(b)(2). The government thereby absorbs some costs.
235. See SUPESFUND CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 102. Some feedstocks are hazardous
when spilled or improperly disposed. Id.
236. See id.
237. See 301(E) STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 36, at 248. There seems to be an
inverse correlation between socio-economic status and proximity to hazardous substances and
conditions. Remarks of Leslie Cheek, III, Conference on the New EPA 11 (Sept. 27. 1983)
(available from Crum & Foster Ins. Cos., Washington, D.C.). Consequently, having the
public or customers who benefit from the use of chemicals bear the costs of injuries rather
than the victims who are less likely to be able to bear them spreads the social costs more
equitably.
238. See OECD2, supra note 229, at 10.
239. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 6, at 930; Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste, supra note 9, at 598 n.63. The elimination of individual firm liability also
eliminates the incentive to reduce costs of liability by the use of safer methods. Note, Toxic
Substance Contamination, supra note 127, at 68-69. The taxation of hazardous wastes at the
disposal site might be successful at achieving deterrence and internalization although it does
not seem to be tied to any level of toxicity or risk. See H.R. 4813, sees. 331-333, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984). Without strict enforcement, it might lead to improper disposal or illegal
"midnight dumping" of hazardous wastes. Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 6, at 934.
Critics have attacked the Superfund approach to financing as leading to many social
costs such as loss of export markets by the chemcial industry, adverse balance of payment,
and unfavorable unemployment consequences. See G. Freeman, Jr., Toxic Torts, Hazardous
Wastes, and the Superfund 41 (Oct. 19-20, 1983) (paper delivered at the Sixth Annual
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Adequate compensation for hazardous substance injuries necessitates minimization of deterrence. Making deterrence part of a

compensation system would require allocating responsibility to specific firms as in traditional tort actions. The difficulties of establishing firm-specific responsibility for hazardous substance pollution
would be the same as under current law. 240 The alternatives would
be to create a limited compensation system like the Glass II system
in Japan or to continue the inadequate common law system. Such
alternatives prevent satisfactory compensation by limiting awards
to those who sustain the burden of proving causation.
It is not currently possible to tie levies to a firm-specific level of
risk.24 1 Faced with this obstacle and a need to stress compensation,
the Proposed Bill leaves deterrence and firm-specific liability to
plenary actions by a victim. Vigorous enforcement of direct regulations and standards accomplishes deterrence. 242 Direct regulation
has always been more popular in the United States than the "polluter pays" theory of liability. 243 The Proposed Bill reflects a pru-

Conference, National Legal Center for the Public Interest). However, the costs of injury
should be carried by the industry that creates them because it is unfair to burden the innocent
victim with these costs and because efforts to reduce the costs will ultimately benefit the
public. See 30 1(E) STUDY GROUP REPORT, supro note 36, at 248.
240. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
241. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 6, at 934 n.313. Accurate risk assessment, or
requiring fund contributors to make payments based on the magnitude of the risk caused by
the substances they manufacture, again, requires more scientific knowledge of the effect of
substances on human health than currently exists. See Abraham, supra note 17, at 127. As
more etiological studies are conducted, risk assessment may be more viable. For an analysis of
the use of risk assessment in this field, see Note, Toxic Substance Contamination,supra note
127, at 53.
242. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (regulates marketing of toxic substances); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) (regulates water quality); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (regulates disposal of hazardous wastes);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (regulates air quality). Japan
is also dependent on regulations and emission standards which may explain some of the
country's tolerance for the mixed system described in this Note. Behavior modification
through economic incentives is coupled with strict regulatory enforcement. See generally
QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84, at 118-272 (discussing anti-pollution measures
enacted); J. GaEssEa & K. FUJIxURA, supra note 73, at 229-79 (discussing regulatory process
and standards); OECD1, supra note 155, at 16-36 (pollution control by standards); Irwin,
Toxic Substances Laws and Enforcement, 40 RABELS ZEITSCHuF-r FOR AUSL. NDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 474, 475-78 (1976) (discussing Japanese law regulating hazardous substances).
243. Gresser, supra note 67, at 121.
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dent unwillingness to experiment with economic solutions when
injuries from hazardous substances are at issue.244
CONCLUSION
Compensation of victims of exposure to hazardous substances
is a major issue before the United States Congress. Because of the
inadequacies of common law actions, an administrative compensation system has been proposed to reduce the problems facing victims. The Japanese have used an administrative system of compensation for the past ten years. A comparison of the United States and
Japanese methods of solving this problem emphasizes the difficulties of creating a system that both compensates victims and deters
injurious behavior. The Proposed Bill manifests an understanding
of this difficulty by its emphasis of the compensation goal. The
proposed legislation, with the minor alterations suggested above,
2 45
should be adopted as law.
David E. Bronston

244. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PucEs AND PUBLIC POLICY 107 (1975).
See also Abraham, supra note 17, at 148 (compensation funds in toxic tort field should stress
compensation; direct governmental regulation is preferrable for abating injurious behavior).
245. At the time of publication, the Proposed Bill was defeated in the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism by a 5-4 vote. Telephone interview with
Chris Harris, aide to Congressman Florio (Apr. 6, 1984).

